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This report shows evidence about determinants of health status for urban adults and their
effects on productivity. Accurate estimation of the effect of health on wages is always
difficult to obtain due to endogeneity and measurement error of the health indicators that are
available in household surveys for developing countries. The health measure used here is the
number of days ill, which involves  endogeneity and reporting error problems that are
controlled for. The use of household sanitary infrastructure and proxies for health prices,
measured by the distance to the health center and the average waiting time for attention at
the district level, enabled the construction of an instrument variable estimator for the effects
of health on wages. The instruments are statistically significant for all urban individuals.
Schooling effects on health are positive and strong for urban males, and the positive effect of
schooling on health is clearly increasing with age.
The effect of health on wages is positive and robust, especially for urban males. The larger
effects of an additional day sick are found among older self-employed males (-4.3%) and
those at the bottom of the hourly earnings distribution (-3.8%), and those in the private
sector (-1.8%). These results suggest that health has a stronger impact on the wages of those
jobs where productivity and health are closely connected, as in the private sector and the
self-employed. The inconclusive results among females indicate the need to work in the
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The empirical connection between investments in education and wages has been widely analyzed,
both in developed and developing countries. In contrast, the returns in the labor market to investments in
health have been much less studied, although the conceptual connection has long been present in the
development literature, for instance, through the idea of efficiency wages (for an overview, see Strauss and
Thomas, 1995). The reasons for this situation are based on conceptual difficulties, as well as on the lack of
databases that include both health variables and measures of wages or productivity.
On one side, healthier individuals would tend to be more productive either at work or school, and
consequently, they will end up getting higher wages in the labor market. But richer individuals will also
tend to be healthier, either because they have more resources to spend on health, or because they have
more knowledge about the consequences of their consumption choices and behaviors on their own health.
Under these circumstances, it is difficult to infer the impact of health-improving policy interventions on
individuals’ earnings. On the other side, adequate measures of health status are generally scarce in
developing countries, especially for adult individuals. The most commonly available indicators are related
to self-reported morbidity (days-ill or days-disabled), but they face serious limitations due to self-
reporting biases (see Schultz and Tansel, 1997).
In this study, we focus on the estimation of the effects of health, as measured by the days ill
reported by adult individuals over the four weeks prior to the day of the survey, on the average hourly
income obtained by wage-earners and self-employed individuals in urban Peru. The database we use
comes from the 1994 Peruvian Living Standards Measurement Survey (PLSMS). In principle, it is
assumed that the estimated Mincer wage equation has an unobservable health status variable as part of the
set of explanatory variables, which is approximated by the observable morbidity indicator. Our objective
is twofold. First, we analyze the nature of the interaction between the two classical measures of human
capital, education and health, in a wage equation. Second, we examine the effects of health on wages
using different sub-samples distinguished by gender, age, location in the wage distribution, and type of
employer (public/private; large/small) and employment (blue-collar/white-collar; wage-earner/self-
employed).
To properly estimate these effects, we control for endogeneity and measurement error in the
available health indicator by using a predicted value for health status with a health equation. The health
equation is obtained by solving a household model that has health in the utility function, and a particular
production function for health. Individual health outcomes are, thus, a function of individual, family and
regional characteristics. To identify health in the wage equation, we have sanitary infrastructure and the
availability of health services as the variables that directly affect health but not wages.4
The regression results of the (negative) health status equation were very robust for males only, but
instruments were also found to be robustly significant for females. For males, we find age differences in
the effect of schooling on morbidity. Older males tend to get sick more or longer. But, more importantly,
the effect of schooling is uncertain for young males, but is increasing with age, reducing the probability of
illness or the number of days sick. Access to adequate housing infrastructure has a negative effect on
morbidity, an effect that is very similar across areas (urban/rural) and genders. On the other hand, district-
average waiting times before receiving attention in local health centers are positively correlated with
urban males’ morbidity.
The wage equations for each sector were estimated using Lee (1983)’s MNL-OLS extension of
the Heckman two-stage procedure. The instruments used for the second step were the household’s asset
endowments and local labor market characteristics. Regression results show that healthier individuals
receive higher wages, even after controlling for education and income effects. Also, returns to education
are slightly smaller when health is included in the wage equation, indicating that previous studies might
have been overestimating these returns. For males a clear pattern is observed: the effects of bad health on
wages are larger for those self-employed, in the private sector and those at the bottom of the wage
distribution. The results for females are less conclusive, probable indicating the need for a better model to
reflect the way females insert themselves into the labor market.
The paper is organized as follows. In chapter 2, we describe the model used to derive the wage
and health equations. In chapter 3, we discuss the nature of the data in the 1994 PLSMS, in terms of the
connection between health and wages. In chapter 4, we describe the econometric model used to estimate
both equations, and discuss the strategy followed to overcome usual problems in this kind of estimation.
Chapter 5 presents the results for the basic model for wage-earners and self-employed, as well as the
differences that result from using rather interesting sub-samples. Finally, chapter 6 includes a summary of
the findings and some concluding remarks.
2. The conceptual model
The first step is to describe the way health affects individual and household decisions. This analysis
is based on a household model with constrained maximization of a joint utility function, following the
framework initiated by Becker (1981). It is assumed that a household with n members is run by the household5
head who maximizes a utility function (U), which depends on the consumption, health and leisure of all
members
1,
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where,
i.e., C
i  is a J dimensional vector, with elements corresponding to a commodity group, h
i  denotes the health
status and l
i  denotes the leisure of member i. It is assumed that the utility function is continuous, strictly
increasing, strictly quasi-concave and twice-continuously differentiable in all its arguments. Also, it satisfies
the Inada condition, i.e., the marginal utility Ux ﬁ ¥ as x ﬁ 0, for x c h l
i i i = , , , for all i.
The health status of each household member is determined by a general production function, h .
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i denotes the consumption of health-related inputs by individual i, Z
i denotes the member’s observed
characteristics, F denotes the access to sanitary and/or medical infrastructure, and u denotes the vector of
unobserved characteristics. Also, X
-i denotes the consumption, health and leisure of the other members of the
family, and Z
-i, u
-i denote their vectors of observed and unobserved individual characteristics, respectively.
The specific variables that appear in the health production change if the i-th member is an adult, a child or an
infant. For instance, in a child’s health production function, milk consumption and education of the parents
are important components in C
i and Z 
-i, respectively, although they would probably not be important in an
adult’s health production function. Since adults tend to take care of themselves, it would be only their own
education that matters. In the case of adults, the set of unobservable characteristics include health/nutritional
status in earlier years, especially as a child.
The household also faces a full income constraint, which is derived from the time and income
constraints,
                                               
1. This is equivalent to assume that household members have identical preferences, that a dictator rules the
household, or generally, a unitary household model. Assuming bargaining to explain intra-household allocations
complicates the results without providing additional insights for the goals of the paper.
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where (P) represents price, (V) is non-labor income, (W) is the wage rate, (T
a) is the total time available of the
adult members, and (S) is the full income. Non-labor income (V) includes net profits of any home enterprise,
as well as other rents.
The reduced-form health demand function for adults would have the following form
2:
h = h (P P S F u )
i
C Y
i i * , , , ,          Z          (4)
Although the conditional demand functions have usual properties, that is not true for the reduced-
form demand equations in (4). The key point is that consumption affects health too, and substitution effects
may attenuate some of the direct effects. For instance, as pointed out by Pitt and Rosenzweig (1986), a
decrease in the price of health services Py or an improvement in sanitary or house infrastructure F could
generate substitution in consumption patterns that can reinforce or attenuate the positive health effects of such
changes. Consequently, nothing conclusive can be said about the effect of prices, or even sanitary
infrastructure upon health status, before the econometric estimation.
Finally, following Mincer (1962) or Mincer and Polacheck (1974), the hourly wage equation is
defined as a function of the individuals’ working experience (A), education (E), health status (h), and regional
variables that characterize local labor markets (L), as in (5).
( ) w w A E h L ij ij ij ij j ij = , , , ;e (5)
The specific functional forms for equations (4) and (5) to be used in the empirical analysis are
discussed in section 4 below.
3.  The Peruvian data.
The 1994 PLSMS contains information on adult morbidity and net income for wage-earners and the
self-employed, as well as on the characteristics of all individuals in urban and rural households
3. The total
sample size is 19,284 individuals organized in 3,623 households. We restrict our analysis to urban areas
because rural labor markets would have a very different structure, and its modeling would probably require a
                                               
2 . The health production functions are assumed to be twice-continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, and
strictly concave function in all arguments. Then, the constraint set formed by (2), and the full income constraint (3) is
convex and the optimization of (1) yields a unique solution. Assuming that the health production functions satisfy the
Inada condition guarantees the solution to be interior.
3 . See Grosh and Gleewe (1995) for more details on LSMS surveys.7
more complicated structure
4. Further restricting our analysis to adults (16 to 60 years old), our working
sample size comes down to 6610 individuals, of which 3,102 are males.
The health measure used in this report is the “Number of days sick or injured in the last four
weeks”. Typically, LSMS Surveys include a sequence of questions on health and sickness, asking first
“Have you had any illness or injury during the past four weeks?,” and continuing with the number of days
sick, and the number of days disabled due to sickness and other related information.  Among these
variables, we choose the number of days sick because we presume that it contains more information about
the latent health status of individuals than the simple indicator about illness events, that is, we presume
that an individual with less days sick in the last four weeks is generally healthier.
The typical problem with self-reported health status indicators is that they are contaminated by
other individual characteristics such as education and other measures related to the ability to detect
illnesses. Between two similar individuals, the one with more unobserved skills to detect an illness would
tend to report a larger number of days-ill than the less skilled. Under this type of endogeneity, a positive
bias is expected for the coefficients of the health variables. Alternatively, Schultz and Tansel (1997) have
worked with the number of days disabled for Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire, because it is assumed that such an
indicator is less contaminated by this problem, since indicators of functional disability are less subjective.
Such a measure, however, loses information on the morbidity of individuals, since those sick but not
disabled are considered as healthy as those who experienced no illness at all. In this sense, there is a
tradeoff between using a more strict measure that loses information, or using a measure that is more
subjective but also more informative.
In the PLSMS, 27% of the individuals aged between 16 and 60 reported having been ill or an
accident during the four weeks previous to the survey (see figure 1, below). About a third those individuals
report having been disabled as a result of that illness or accident. Despite the potential reporting bias, we
choose days-ill in the hourly wage regressions, because it contains valuable information about the latent
health status of individuals, especially in the case of the illness events that did not affect functionality.
                                               
4.  Valdivia and Robles (1997) investigated the particular nature of Peruvian labor markets. A relevant feature
for the purposes of this study is that most economic units are very small and mainly use family labor. Wage labor
markets are used only occasionally or according to the seasonality of agricultural labor demand, to generate some
monetary income.8















The variable days-ill is not only censored at zero, but also at 28, since the question refers to the
number of days that the individual was ill during the 4 weeks prior to the survey. As mentioned before,
73% of surveyed individuals did not report any sickness. Figure 2 shows the distribution of individuals by
the number of days ill, where only those with one or more days are included. Note that, of these, 14%
reported being sick for the entire period (28 days). Overall, the average number of days ill is about 2.5
days, but the number is positively correlated with age, as can be seen in Figure 3. For instance, the
average number of days ill is below 2 for individuals under 30, but rises above 4 for individuals over 50.
This trend is not only the result of a higher probability of getting sick as you get older, but also that older
people tend to get sick for longer periods.9
As the main question in this paper is the connection between health and productivity, we must
discuss the potential impact of particularities in the Peruvian labor market. The Peruvian economy has a
considerable fraction of its labor force in self-employment, and this fraction has been growing through
time. Table 1 in Appendix B shows descriptive statistics for the full sample of males and females and also
for those individuals involved in each sector.
In the 1994 PLSMS, about 33% of the individuals aged 16 to 60 were involved in the wage
sector, while almost 27% was performing self-employed activities. These proportions represent 56% and
44% of all working individuals, respectively. The rest were either unemployed, working as unpaid family
workers, or not participating. The proportion of self-employed among those working also differs across
genders. Among females the proportion of self-employed workers is 49%, but it is only 41% among
males.
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The measure of earnings used in this study is the average hourly wage or net income over the
twelve months prior to the time of the interview. This indicator varies significantly between sectors, with
the earnings of the self-employed being larger than those of wage earners. When the differences are
examined by gender, it appears that self-employed males are better paid than those in the wage sector.
Among females, however, wage earners are better paid, but the difference is not significant. This may
reflect a gender gap in the accumulation of human capital, since self-employed females have four years
less education on average. Differences can also be observed in morbidity indicators. The self-employed
report the most days ill in the last four weeks, followed by those who are not participating in the labor
force; with wage earners reporting the fewest.10
Given the observable differences among individuals in different employment sectors, one could
easily suspect of other unobservable differences among these individuals that could generate some types
of self-selection. Therefore, we need to control for such selectivity in order to estimate wage equations for
each sector. Considering these issues, the next section discusses the econometric techniques used to
address some of the potential biases in this study.
4. The Econometric Method and Strategy
In this section, we discuss the econometric methods used to estimate the entire system of
regressions, including the (negative) health status equation, the participation equation, and the wage
equation. First, we explain the model specification for each of these equations. Then, we discuss the
simultaneity issues that complicate the estimation, and finally present the strategy to estimate the desired
unbiased parameters.
The Health Status Equation
First, we specify a latent health variable  h
*  that is determined by a linear specification of
equation (4) from section 2. That is, h H i i i
* ' = + b m , where  ( ) H P P S F Z u i c y
i i = , , , , , . As we observe
only the proxy, number of days ill (h), the relationship between h
* and h is given by the following
conditions:
h if h H
h if c h H
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The double censoring of the proxy h requires that we estimate h* through a two-limit tobit model.
Following Lee (1981), we then obtain the predicted values  $ $ ' h H i i = b  and insert this constructed variable
in the wage equation
5. To identify health in the wage equation, we use food prices, housing infrastructure
and indirect health cost variables in H, according to equation (4) in section 2. They are both assumed to
be highly correlated with the individuals’ health status and uncorrelated with individual wages. Both
assumptions will be tested with appropriate specification tests.
According to (4), self-reported individual health status depends on prices of consumption and health-
related goods, household full income, access to sanitary infrastructure and individual observed and
                                               
5 . Alternatively, we could have used  { } max H 0, ' $ b in the wage equation, an alternative which is discussed
below.11
unobserved characteristics. Here, we will use self-reported morbidity events in the 4 weeks previous to the
application to the survey as a proxy for (negative) health status.
For measures of full income S, we take the household’s productive and non-productive assets. As
non-productive assets, we include the value of the house and other durables. As measure of productive assets,
we include a dummy for the operation of a household business. We are not using the reported profits from
household business since there is a considerable amount of reporting error in the data, something already
observed in developing countries (Thomas and Strauss, 1997).
Individual observed characteristics include the age of the individual and his/her education, among
others. As measures of sanitary infrastructure F, we use the existence of in-house connections for potable
water and sewerage, but also whether the house has proper floors, walls and ceiling. Dirt floors tend to
provide less healthy environments. We also proxied prices of health services with the costs of having access
to those services, e.g., the distance to the health center and the waiting time before receiving attention. Since
these indicators are reported only by those who were sick and received medical attention, we use district
averages in the regression. Given intra-district correlation of errors, we use the corrected covariance matrix
suggested by Moulton (1986, 1990).
The Sector Choice Model
As discussed in section 3, the estimated wage equations in each sector must be corrected for
potential selectivity biases. In this paper, we model the sectoral choice as a multinomial logit (MNL)
model, and then we construct the correction terms for the selection indicator following Lee (1982,1983).
Specifically, we identify three employment status choices (0=non-participation, 1=wage-earners and
2=self-employment)
6, and estimate a multinomial logit in which non-participation is the base category,
and where the underlying latent variable is a linear function of a set of observable characteristics of the
individual, Bi. That is,
  b B Si i S S Si
* ' , = + g s n (7)
where v
Si  is an unobserved error term and s
S the variance of this term.
7 Then, individual i chooses to be in
sector k if
    max{ b b ki Si
* *}, =   for S = 0, 1, 2 (8)
This choice model has a utility interpretation where  bki
*  is interpreted as the indirect utility for
individual i of choosing sector S. Then, a utility maximizing individual will behave as in equation (8).
                                               
6. The self-employment sector includes both, independent workers as well as firm owners.
7  Recall that binary and multinomial choice models identify the coefficients up to a scale, usually assuming
that the variance is equal to one.12
This equation included controls for individual, household and community characteristics. The
variables used for identification of participation in the labor force are community labor market
characteristics and household assets and other non-labor income, as defined for the health status equation.
The wage equation
Given the employment status choice, each individual has an associated wage in each sector,
which is described by the following equation
ln $ w E A h L si S S ij S ij S ij S j Si = + + + + + d d d d d e 0 1 2 3 4 (9)
for S = 1, 2, since no equation is estimated for the non-participants. The earnings equations for wage-
earners and self-employed are estimated taking into account the necessary selection correction, analogous
to the Heckman two-step estimation procedure (see Lee, 1983).
The selection correction term variable is identified in the wage equation through the inclusion of
household assets and non-labor income in B, which are assumed to be highly correlated with individual
participation in the wage labor market, but uncorrelated with individual wages. Both assumptions will be
tested with appropriate Wald tests.
The controls included potential experience and its square, defined as the number of years after
leaving school. The terms for experience and education in (9) could be included in different ways. Age
and health, for instance, could include a linear as well as a quadratic term. Schooling is included in a
spline specification, in order to capture differential returns to education at each education level. Three
terms are included. First, the plane number of years of schooling which is interpreted as the returns to
primary school. The second term, secondary spline, is the product of a dummy equals to one if the
individual reached some level of secondary education, multiplied by the number of years. It captures the
additional returns to secondary school, that is between 7 and 11 years of education. The third term, higher
spline, is defined analogously for post-secondary schooling and captures the additional returns to higher
education that are accumulated to those obtained in primary and secondary education. Consequently, the
returns to an additional year at the university, for instance, would be obtained by adding the value of the
three coefficients..
Firm size controls were also included in the earnings equations for wage earners, following the
motivating work by Anderson (1998). A firm is classified as a micro firm if it has between six and ten
workers. Those having between eleven and twenty are named small, those with more than twenty but no
more than 200 workers are medium sized firms, and those with more than 200 workers are large firms
8.
The omitted category is the firm which has between one and five workers. Even though employer size-
                                               
8. Our definitions of medium and large firms are chosen as in Anderson (1998) for comparability purposes.13
wage effects are not totally explained by unionization or other regulatory  compliances, nor higher
workers quality, employer size-wage premium is still found important in developing countries and in
Peru, in particular (Anderson, 1998)
9. In order to capture the potential employer size-wage premium we
included indicators for the four firm size categories described above: micro, small, medium and large
firms. We also included a control for the degree of market arrangements in each province that may affect
the hourly payment in either wage or self-employment.
The community variables included in the model are the local unemployment rate and the fraction
of hired labor in the locality. For each province, we use the share of labor days worked in exchange of a
wage as the indicator of local labor market development. We presume that when local labor markets are
more developed, the number of labor days worked for a wage rises relative to the number of labor days
worked as self-employed and unpaid family members. Additionally, we include the size of the firm under
the presumption that larger firms tend to pay higher wages (see Anderson, 1998). The selection correction
term is included under IMR. Regional dummies control for geographic differences among the regions
compared to Lima (omitted category).
Some Empirical Issues in the Estimation of the Effects of Health Status on Productivity
In this last sub-section, we expand on the issues that must be addressed to properly measure the
effects of health status on productivity. First, a discussion of the measures for health status and
productivity examines the advantages of the variables used and the potential problems involved. Second,
the endogeneity of health status as a source of bias is discussed to propose an instrumental variable
estimator.
In order to deal with the endogeneity issue discussed in section 3, this health status measure is
instrumented with local community sanitary and household infrastructure. The strong assumption with
these instruments is that the unobserved individual characteristics underlying the determinants of health
status are not correlated with location decisions (i.e., migration), once other household and individual
characteristics have been controlled for. This is not an unusual assumption, since other papers (Schultz
and Tansel, 1997; Thomas and Strauss, 1997) use the same strategy to instrument health status with
community prices and infrastructure. The identification of the model is possible due to the inclusion of
variables in the health status equation that are not included in the wage equation such as the community
infrastructure variables described before.
Another issue in the estimation arises from the fact that in the 1994 PLSMS, only about one third
of the sample reported a positive number of days sick during the last four weeks. This relatively small
                                               
9. We did not include firm size in the earnings equation for the self-employed, understanding that we would14
fraction of uncensored information on health represents a problem when estimating the relationship
between health and productivity because such health indicator does not allow to distinguish the health
status differences among those that did not report any sickness. In this paper we circumvent this problem
by using the predicted estimate from the tobit model as an index for the latent health variable. By using
the uncensored estimated index we are assuming that a  healthier person has a lower index (more
negative)  and try to evaluate whether this implies higher productivity for the individual. We use this
estimated index in the second stage wage equation.
Before explaining the results, some caveats regarding the econometric strategy should be
mentioned. First, unobserved heterogeneity in the health status regression could cause three main
problems. If those unobserved characteristics are correlated with the regressors, the estimates might be
biased. On the other hand, if these unobserved components are not correlated with observed
characteristics,  heteroskedasticity patterns might appear. Even though this problem does not affect
consistency in linear models (OLS) , it is a potential source of inconsistency in nonlinear models (see
Maddala, 1981 p. 179). The conditional expectation, however, is still consistent, and this is the instrument
used in the second stage estimation. Second, the tobit equation actually identifies the parameters of the
model based on the uncensored section of the data. The conditional expectation used in the second stage
is based on those estimates to predict the latent health status variable for the entire working sample. The
assumption is that the estimated parameters are common for all individuals. Third, to obtain the
conditional expectation of the health status through the  Tobit estimates  a normality assumption is
imposed. While this is a direct approach to this problem, the conditional expectation loses any non-
normal behavior that could be present in the latent health variable. If these data peculiarities are
important, a more flexible approach should be examined.
It must be mentioned, however, that these caveats could not be circumvented when the censored
portion is relatively large, as in our case. For instance, semi-parametric estimators for censored models
that are robust to  heteroskedasticity or other  mis-specifications (Powell 1984, 1986) require a small
portion of censored observations. Similarly, a non-parametric approach would require uncensored
information to create a conditional expectation of the health variable. In sum, given the limitations of the
data, distributional assumptions have to be imposed in order to extend the analysis to a larger part of the
sample. In a rather practical approach, Schultz and  Tansel (1997) imposed a linear relationship to
instrument the number of days disabled using an OLS estimation. This approach, however, does not
distinguish the amount of information underlying an unobserved health status (zero disabled days) from
                                                                                                                                                      
need a different interpretation for those estimates, and that no previous empirical work would provide as a reference.15
the variation among those with observed morbidity. The tobit approach used here is more informative
since it properly weights information from the censored and uncensored parts of the sample.
5.  The Econometric Results
In this section we present the results for the health status equation, the sectoral choice model, and the
wage equation. The analysis of the results of the wage equation include a discussion of the results for the
overall sample, by age groups, across the wage distribution, and by public/private employer.
The Health Status Equations: A Two-limit Tobit Model
As indicated in section 4, we estimate the health status equation as a function of individual
characteristics (age, schooling), household characteristics (such as assets and house infrastructure), cost of
health services (distance and waiting time for medical attention), as well as some regional and date of
interview controls. The individual characteristics include age, education, and rural background through a
dummy that indicates who migrated from rural areas. Some interaction terms are also included. First, the
interaction between schooling and age and the implicit health prices. Second, the interaction between rural
background and age.
Table 1 shows the results of the estimation of the tobit model for males and females
10. Since days-ill
is actually negatively correlated with unobserved health status, a positive coefficient means that the
corresponding variable affects negatively the individual’s health status. For instance, the positive coefficient
for age indicates that the health of individuals deteriorates with age. The negative effect for the housing
infrastructure variables indicates that individuals living in houses with appropriate sanitary facilities tend to
be healthier. It is important to notice the negative coefficient found for the distance to the closest health
facility, which would indicate that the more accessible the health facility, the more aware is the individual of
their health status. This result shows the importance of the reporting bias associated to the indicator of health
status used here. The same is true for the positive coefficient found for education, an effect that is discussed
below.
                                               
10. In table A.1 of appendix A, we report the regressions using disabled days. Table A.2 in appendix A
compares the probit with the tobit estimation, and also includes an interval regression using weeks-ill.16
Table 1
Health Regression for Peruvian adults by gender and location: A two-limit
(t statistics in parentheses)
Variables Males Females
Individual Characteristics 83.59 ** 69.6 **
1 - Age 0.675 ** 0.243 **
(5.67) (2.96)
2 - Years of schooling 0.720 -0.735
(1.18) -(1.51)
3 - Schooling x Age (x 10
-2
) -3.996 ** -0.066
-(3.51) -(0.09)
4 - Rural migrant 11.539 ** -1.982
(3.55) -(0.59)
5 - Rural migrant x Age -0.236 ** 0.076
-(3.04) (0.88)
Household Assets 5.98 0.77
6 - Non-Labor Income 0.132 0.056
(1.24) (0.64)
7 - Nonproductive assets -0.093 0.024
-(0.51) (0.14)
8 - Home business 2.471 ** 0.572
(2.13) (0.59)
Housing Infrastructure 6.12 ** 7.19 **
9 - Adequate ceiling -2.707 ** -2.864 **
-(2.29) -(2.63)
10 Adequate floors -0.533 0.394
-(0.45) (0.33)
Health Infrastructure 7.84 * 4.45
11 Distance time to health service -13.375 ** -9.651 *
-(1.80) -(1.64)
12 Wait. time to medical attention -0.015 -2.649
-(0.01) -(1.25)
13 Dist. time to health service x schooling 1.314 ** 0.681
(2.40) (1.33)
14 Wait. time to medical attention x schooling 0.123 0.246
(0.50) (1.20)
Food Prices 5.59 * 14.27 **
15 Potato price 7.265 ** 5.087
(2.36) (1.35)
16 Milk price 3.688 13.330
(0.83) (3.58)
Log Likelihood -3399.62 -4863.72
Global Chi-squared 281.00 387.27
Number of observations 3083 3486
(*) Statistically significant at 10% level of confidence.
(**) Statistically significant at 5% level of confidence.
 / A constant and control variables for regions and interview months are
   included in all regressions, but not reported.17
Household permanent income, as proxied by the per capita value of family assets (variables 6 to 8 in
table 1), is included in the regression analysis, but none of them appear to be significant. Although, any
theoretical framework would imply the need to include some measures of household income, previous studies
have not succeeded in obtaining a strong empirical relationship (see, for instance, Schultz and Tansel, 1997).
We also tried some other alternative measures such as per capita household expenditures (exogenous) and per
capita full income (instrumented) but neither was significant.
The analysis presents consistent and robust results for males, but not so much for females.
Nevertheless, the proposed instruments for endogenizing health in the wage equation are strongly significant
for both sub-samples. Recall from section 2 that key instrumental variables are the indicators for food prices,
housing infrastructure and implicit prices for health inputs. Access to a house with adequate floors and
ceilings does increase the health status of adult individuals.
Differences of human capital effects over the life-cycle
It is very interesting to see the interaction between the different forms of human capital, as measured
by age, completed years of schooling, and migration experience, over the life cycle (across cohorts). First,
even after controlling for other factors, the health of Peruvian adults clearly deteriorates with age, an effect
that is stronger for male adults. When included, the quadratic term for age was not found significant, a result
consistent with the strong linear correlation observed in figure 3.
Somewhat surprisingly, table 1 seems to indicate that education matters only for males. Nevertheless,
when calculating net schooling effects (table 2), we see that this variable is also significant for adult females
at particular ages
11. But there are, indeed, important gender differences in the role of human capital
endowments for the determination of individual health status. First, more educated males have more days-ill
reported over the four weeks prior to the survey, when they are younger than 33, but the effect turns
increasingly negative afterwards. This result differs from those of Strauss et.al., (1993) with anthropometric
measures, and would indicate differences in the magnitude of the self-reporting bias over the life cycle. That
is, young non-educated males may be less inclined to report illnesses than their less educated counterparts. At
older ages, though, the seriousness of the illnesses may eliminate subjectivity in reporting. On the other hand,
the schooling effect for females is constant around -0.25 over the life cycle. This implies that the schooling
effect for individuals around 30 is larger (more negative) for females than for their male counterparts, but
                                               
11. Net effects reported in table 2 refer to the variation of the schooling and migration effects due to the
interaction terms with age and implicit health prices included in the tobit model of table 1. Table 2 also includes the
estimated net effects associated to a regression without the interaction terms for education and implicit health prices.
It is interesting to notice that, although, the individual coefficients for education change significantly, that is not so
for the estimated net education effects.18
much smaller afterwards. These results are corroborated when looking at the regressions by age groups, as
reported in table A.3 of appendix A.
Table 2: Net effect on health by gender and age groups
Male Female
Age W/o Base w/o Base
Net Schooling effect on
16 years 0.70 ** 0.69 * -0.25 -0.24
(0.01) (0.01) (0.29) (0.30)
30 years 0.13 0.13 -0.25 * -0.25 *
(0.37) (0.38) (0.09) (0.10)
45 years -0.47 ** -0.47 * -0.26 * -0.26 *
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.03)
60 years -1.08 ** -1.07 * -0.27 -0.27
(0.00) (0.00) (0.12) (0.12)
Net Migrant effect on Health
16 years 7.59 ** 7.76 * -0.63 -0.77
(0.00) (0.00) (0.77) (0.72)
30 years 4.44 ** 4.46 * 0.40 0.30
(0.00) (0.00) (0.74) (0.80)
45 years 1.06 0.92 1.50 1.44
(0.40) (0.47) (0.18) (0.20)
60 years -2.31 -2.62 2.60 2.58
(0.25) (0.19) (0.22) (0.23)
/  Results in first and third columns refer to regressions reported in table 1. Results in second and fourth
columns are based on a regression that includes interaction terms between schooling  and housing
Infrastructure. The numbers in parentheses are the corresponding p-values.
The other indicator of human capital included for the regressions for urban areas was the dummy
variable indicating whether the individual had migrated from a rural area. The positive coefficient in table 1
indicates that, other things equal, a rural background implies poorer health status for adult males, either due to
the poorer previous sanitary environment or economic situation. It is also possible, though, that such an
indicator could be capturing some ethnic differences since it is limited to migration events from rural areas
where there is a strong concentration of individuals with indigenous background. But, if that were the case,
the effect would be persistently negative (or positive) over the life cycle. That is not the case, though, since
the coefficient of the interaction term is clearly negative
12. Table 2 shows that the net effect is indeed negative
for males around 50 years old and older. These findings support the interpretation that the migration indicator
captures previous sanitary and economic conditions that put migrants in disadvantage with respect to urban
                                               
12. When regressing by age groups (table A.3 in appendix A), we also find that the migration indicator implies
poorer health for young (below 30), but has the opposite effect for older individuals (above 45). For the intermediate age
group the effect is still negative, but significantly smaller.19
natives when they first move. The other implication is that there is evidence that significant catching up in
health conditions occurs as time passes
13.
Employment Status Choice: Non-participation, Wage and Self-employment
The potential selection bias in the estimation of the earning equations in both sectors is corrected
here using the MNL-OLS two-stage correction method proposed by Lee (1983). In Table 3, MNL sectoral
choice estimates for males and females are shown. Education is controlled in the sectoral choice model by
including three dummies for each level of formal education, and interactions of these dummies with the
number of years of schooling. This flexible functional form is intended to capture any non-linearities in
the effects of education on  sectoral labor choice. The results indicate that education increases the
participation of individuals in a non linear way. Moreover, as education increases, the likelihood of
joining the wage sector increases faster than the self-employment sector. The estimated coefficients for
age and age squared indicate an inverted U-shape for males and females, where males peak around 43
years and females around 38 years.
Wealth and income control variables included a measure of assets, non labor income and the
existence of a household business. The accumulation of non-productive assets has an important negative
effect on joining any sector, but is even stronger for wage employment, probably reflecting some
complementarity between household non-productive assets (a stove, for example) and self-employment
activities (cooking). The home business variable can be also interpreted as the existence of another
income source, which clearly increases the propensity to join the self-employment sector as a firm owner.
The results indicate a suggestive difference for males and females. Among males, we do not find such
effect, probably because males are most commonly attached to the wage sector. Among females, the
effect is negative, consistent with a traditional behavior where males are associated with the wage sector
and females attached to home-related activities. Other explanations as a segmented labor market for males
and females are not ruled out based on this evidence.
The effect of local unemployment rate is positive for both genders, but weaker for males.
Individuals living in provinces with larger unemployment rates tend to participate more, and even more in
the wage sector and among females. In other words, provinces with weak economic growth have higher
participation of females, possibly as an additional source of household income. The proportion of hired
                                               
13. These results would be consistent with the empirical literature on the convergence of income of migrants
and natives in several countries as time passes (see, for instance, Borjas, 1994). We do not analyze this result
further, but it can be said that the evidence here does not reject a hypothesis that the catching up in income may be
at least partly related to the catching up in health reported here.20
labor in each province does not have a significant effect on the sectoral choice. There is only an imprecise
negative effect on the probability of joining the wage sector among females.
Table 3
Participation Equation for Urban Adults: A Multinomial Logit Model
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Males Females
Variables Wage-earner Self-employ. Wage-earner Self Employ.
Individual Characteristics 493.22 ** 581.56 ** 323.59 ** 279.81 **
1 - Age 0.594 ** 0.702 ** 0.228 ** 0.393 **
(18.29) (18.85) (8.48) (14.26)
2 - Age squared (x 10
-2
) -0.734 ** -0.824 ** -0.341 ** -0.469 **
-(16.69) -(16.65) -(8.84) -(12.88)
3 - Dummy primary school 2.130 ** 1.649 ** -0.403 -0.145
(3.06) (2.29) -(0.92) -(0.45)
4 - Years of school (Primary) -0.130 -0.015 -0.041 0.043
-(1.16) -(0.13) -(0.53) (0.78)
5 - Dummy secondary school 0.976 1.038 -1.580 ** 0.033
(1.26) (1.21) -(2.29) (0.05)
6 - Years of school (Secondary) 0.061 0.048 0.142 ** -0.003
(0.94) (0.66) (2.28) -(0.05)
7 - Dummy high education -1.695 * -0.395 -5.427 ** -1.219 *
-(1.63) -(0.33) -(6.29) -(1.04)
8 - Years of school (High) 0.204 ** 0.093 0.441 ** 0.077 *
(3.04) (1.20) (7.77) (0.97)
Household Assets 28.89 ** 344.27 ** 12.41 ** 611.09 **
9 - Non-Labor Income (x 10
-2
) -0.467 -2.770 ** 0.688 0.246
-(0.42) -(2.12) (0.77) (0.25)
10 - Nonproductive assets -0.155 ** -0.144 ** -0.046 ** -0.077 **
-(5.25) -(4.45) -(2.27) -(3.80)
11 - Home business -0.007 21.330 ** -0.237 ** 20.785 **
-(0.06) (18.35) -(2.44) (24.67)
Labor Market Variables 6.24 ** 1.89 7.41 ** 4.96 *
12 - Unemployment rate (by 1.556 * 1.426 2.073 ** 1.764 **
province) (1.74) (1.37) (2.65) (2.21)
13 - Hired rate (by province) 0.641 -1.019 -1.384 * -0.964
(0.69) -(0.85) -(1.85) -(1.02)
Number of observations 3102 3508
Log Likelihood -2290.5 -2770.3
Global Chi-squared 546.4 ** 205851 ** 349.6 ** 338244 **
Chi-squared of Instruments 33.2 ** 798.1 ** 17.8 ** 1657.9 **
/  See note to table 1.
Using the estimates from the sectoral selection model, we constructed the selection correction
terms described above and included it in the wage equation. In the next part, the endogeneity of health
status is examined.21
Instrumenting health status in the wage equation
Here, we discuss the results of inserting health in the wage equation, using the information
obtained from the health status and sectoral choice equations. We find a robust positive effect of health
status on productivity and wages, and also some evidence of interaction between health and other human
capital variable, education.
In Table 4.a and 4.b, we present different specifications for the log hourly net earnings equations
for wage earners and self-employed, respectively. In both cases, we include estimated earnings equations
without health (columns 1 and 4), which are discussed first in order to establish the consistency of our
specification with previous estimations. For instance, an important finding in terms of the estimated
returns to schooling is that they are higher for females and increasing in the level of educational
attainment, especially among wage earners. The use of a spline specification for the returns to schooling
allows us to find this pattern. As explained in section 4, the first coefficient in column 1 of table 4.a
means that each year of primary schooling imply an increase of 5,2% in wages for males. The second
coefficient is not significantly different from zero, which means that such return is about the same for
each year of secondary school. Finally, the third coefficient means that each year of post-secondary
school would increase wages for males in about 13,0% (5,2+1,2+6,6).
Among females, returns to primary and secondary schooling go up to 8,7%, which is 3.5
percentage points above the returns for males. Nevertheless, this gender difference almost vanishes when
individuals reach higher education. The results for the self-employed show a very similar pattern although
less precise. The return to primary schooling among males is 5,0% and 7,7% for females, reproducing the
gender difference observed among wage earners. Returns to higher education increase for self-employed
males. Nevertheless, no evidence of such increasing pattern is identified for females.
The increasing pattern found for returns to education is consistent with previous findings by
Saavedra (1997) for the Peruvian case
14. These increasing returns would support the notion that each pool
of workers (skilled, unskilled) faces a qualitative different labor market, where there is abundance of
people with primary and secondary education and a scarce number of workers with higher education, as it
is the case in Peru (see table 1 in appendix B).
In terms of the firm size effect, our results indicate a significant positive effect, consistent with
Anderson (1998). Among wage employed males the premium is about 16% for micro firms (6-10
workers), goes up to 23% for small firms (11-20) and to 36% for medium firms (21-200), and remains
almost constant afterwards. Among females, the estimated firm size premium shows a similar pattern,22
although no significant effect is found for micro firms. We did not include firm size controls in the
earnings equation for the self-employed, understanding that the transmission mechanism would need to be
different.
Tables 4.a and 4.b also show the wage regressions including health, both, as exogenous and
instrumented (IV). The inclusion of health as exogenous show no significant effect, and does not change
any of the estimates for the control variables, for any gender or sector. This may have different
explanations. Endogeneity in the health measure would imply that those with better unobserved skills,
who are probably earning higher wages, will report more days sick generating a positive bias in the
estimation. On the other hand, a purely random measurement error biases the estimates towards zero.
Finally, the censoring that affects our morbidity indicator also reduces substantially the variation in this
explanatory variable making it hard to find any precision in the effects. A combination of these factors
could lead to the imprecise effects of exogenous health on wages.
When instrumenting health in the wage equations, we do found significant effects of Days Ill on
wages in both sectors, although albeit small. Among males, an increase of one unit in our morbidity
indicator implies a 1.2% decrease in wages and a 3.1% decrease in hourly net income for the self-
employed. One possible explanation for this result is related to sectoral differences in the observability of
individual productivity. In the wage sector, the employer cannot observe individual productivity (effort)
by looking at the final output, when the production function is stochastic and the external shock are not
observed. Even in a deterministic environment, employers face an observability problem if tasks are
performed in large teams
15. The results among females does not show any significant sectoral differences.
The effect of our morbidity indicator is –2.4% among wage earners and –2.3% among the self-employed
sector.
                                                                                                                                                      
14. Saavedra (1997) reports this same pattern for 3 samples of the available PLSMS. However, this result
differs from the decreasing pattern reported by Birdsall (1996) for other Latin American countries.
15. Actually, we cannot discard the possibility that part of the differences found here would be related to the
different nature of contracts in these two sectors, as a result of which, wage-earners receive a lower premium for
health. The explanation based on different contractual agreements is discussed further when examining the
differences between public and private workers.Table 4.a
Equation for the Log Hourly Earnings for Urban Wage Earners by Gender:   Instrumenting Health
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Male Female
No health Exog. Health IV Health No health Exog. Health
Individual Human Capital Variables 94.45 ** 70.99 ** 72.43 ** 28.39 ** 22.24 **
1 - Years of schooling (x 10
-2
) 5.161 ** 5.186 ** 4.757 ** 8.709 ** 8.753 **
(2.31) (2.33) (2.13) (2.94) (2.94)
2 - Years of schooling  minus 6 (x 10
-2
) 1.206 1.177 1.753 -2.295 -2.657
(0.42) (0.41) (0.60) -(0.53) -(0.61)
3 - Years of schooling  minus 12 (x 10
-2
) 6.609 ** 6.607 ** 6.384 ** 7.020 ** 7.298 **
(3.48) (3.48) (3.37) (2.35) (2.44)
4 - # of days sick-instrumented (x 10
-2
) 0.081 -1.216 ** -0.552
(0.20) -(2.23) -(1.28)
Other Individual Characteristics 37.24 ** 36.69 ** 33.72 ** 22.91 ** 23.03 **
5 - Potential Experience 0.029 ** 0.029 ** 0.029 ** 0.030 ** 0.030 **
(4.86) (4.87) (4.97) (3.79) (3.80)
6 - Potential Experience squared (x 10
-3
) -0.313 ** -0.314 ** -0.268 ** -0.279 -0.277
-(2.44) -(2.45) -(2.08) -(1.36) -(1.35)
Firm Size and Local Labor Market 12.20 ** 12.19 ** 11.91 ** 7.81 7.81 **
7 - Micro scale firm 0.156 ** 0.156 ** 0.155 ** 5.4E-03 7.6E-03
(2.76) (2.77) (2.74) (0.07) (0.10)
8 - Small scale firm 0.232 ** 0.231 ** 0.233 ** 0.213 ** 0.216 **
(3.69) (3.67) (3.71) (2.62) (2.66)
9 - Medium scale firm 0.355 ** 0.355 ** 0.347 ** 0.327 ** 0.328 **
(7.20) (7.21) (7.04) (4.62) (4.63)
10 - Large scale firm 0.399 ** 0.400 ** 0.401 ** 0.371 ** 0.375 **
(5.36) (5.36) (5.39) (3.79) (3.83)24
(continuation of table 4.a)
Male Female
No health Exog. Health IV Health No health Exog. Health
11 - Hired rate (by cluster) -0.019 -0.018 -0.052 0.294 * 0.289 *
-(0.16) -(0.15) -(0.43) (1.76) (1.74)
12 - Selection term -0.042 -0.042 -0.020 -0.072 -0.075
-(0.81) -(0.80) -(0.38) -(0.56) -(0.59)
Number of observations 1543 1543 1543 844 844
F-test 39.45 ** 37.17 ** 37.52 ** 33.00 32.22 **
R-squared 0.281 0.281 0.284 0.351 0.352
Exogeneity Test (Hausman) 11.79
(0.00)
Over-identification Test 19.37 **
(0.02)
(*) Statistically significant at 10% level of confidence.
(**) Statistically significant at 5% level of confidence.
/ A constant and regional control variables are included in all regressions, but not reported. Numbers in italics to the right of the labels for the group
  of variables refer to the Wald statistics for the joint significance tests.25
Table 4.b
Equation for the Log Hourly Earnings for Urban Self Employed by Gender:  Instrumenting Health
(t-student in parentheses)
Male Female
No health Exo Health IV Health No health Exo Health
Individual Human Capital Variables 54.04 ** 40.85 ** 42.77 ** 18.66 ** 14.01 **
1 - Years of schooling (x 10
-2
) 5.006 4.901 * 3.527 7.665 ** 7.576 **
(1.52) (1.50) (1.06) (3.35) (3.30)
2 - Years of schooling  minus 6 (x 10
-2
) 4.819 4.901 5.829 -0.464 -0.309
(1.14) (1.17) (1.39) -(0.13) -(0.09)
3 - Years of schooling  minus 12 (x 10
-2
) 5.553 ** 5.520 ** 5.647 * 1.420 1.336
(1.83) (1.82) (1.87) (0.36) (0.34)
4 - # of days sick-instrumented  (x 10
-2
) -0.761 -3.147 ** -0.366
-(1.23) -(3.24) -(0.71)
Other Individual Characteristics 1.14 1.29 3.85 ** 3.82 ** 3.97 **
5 - Potential Experience (x 10
-3
) 3.698 2.780 -12.657 7.010 6.699
(0.19) (0.14) -(0.61) (0.28) (0.27)
6 - Potential Experience squared (x 10
-3
) 0.067 0.090 0.440 0.063 0.072
(0.22) (0.30) (1.30) (0.16) (0.18)
Local Labor Market Characteristics 0.57 0.72 0.27 3.05 ** 2.92 **
7 - Hired rate (by cluster) 0.157 0.176 0.108 0.425 * 0.414 *
(0.75) (0.85) (0.52) (1.75) (1.71)
8 - Selection term -0.418 -0.436 -0.675 ** -0.231 -0.238
-(1.49) -(1.55) -(2.20) -(0.78) -(0.81)
Number of observations 1144 1144 1144 843 843
F-test 19.54 ** 18.43 ** 18.40 ** 9.55 ** 8.82 **
R-squared 0.162 0.164 0.170 0.123 0.124
Exogeneity Test (Hausman) 10.08 **
(0.00)
Over-identification Test 18.34 **
(0.03)
/ See notes to table 4.aThe inclusion of the instrumented morbidity indicator also has also some implications for the
estimated returns to education. In particular, estimated returns to primary education are sligthly smaller ,
although, no significant difference seem to be found for individuals with higher education. Returns to
primary education drop from 5.2% to 4.8% in the wage sector. The drop is even stronger among the self-
employed (from 4.9% to 3.5%). The effect of including health for those with higher education is
significantly smaller in both sectors. For instance, in the wage sector, returns to schooling drop only from
11.6% to 11.2%.
The returns to schooling among females, though, are not affected by the inclusion of health status
as it did to those corresponding to males. This could suggest that the interaction between the two
dimensions of human capital, education and health, is more important among males, and this could be
associated to types of work in which health is as important as education. For example, in jobs where
physical tasks are demanded, both education and good health would affect productivity, while in other
jobs, education may play a more important role. It could be argued that this result would be related to
some sectoral sorting of individuals due to some unobserved characteristics. Nevertheless, the estimated
selection correction coefficients suggest an insignificant selection problem between these sectors, with
and without health in the wage equation (see the coefficients for the inverse Mills ratio (IMR) term in
tables 4.a and 4.b).
Although the discussed IV results seem to be consistent with the stories of  endogeneity and
measurement error associated to our morbidity indicator, it is still important to examine some diagnostic
statistics.  A  Durbin-Hausman-Wu specification test and an over-identification test are shown at the
bottom of tables 4.a and 4.b. The Hausman specification tests suggest that the endogeneity of health status
is important in the sense that the coefficient for the health indicator from the OLS estimates is
significantly different from that of the IV estimates. This can be clearly observed among all males, but
only for those females in the wage sector.
On the other hand, to test the validity of our instruments we used a regression-based over-
identification test suggested by Hausman (1983), and not the Basmann version. The results indicate that
the over-identification restriction is rejected at the 5% level for males in both sectors and for female
wage-earners. These values, however, are close to the critical ones for both genders. As others have
mentioned (Thomas and Strauss, 1997) over-identification and  exogeneity test results must be taken
carefully when the identifying instruments are weak. In this case, the corresponding pseudo-R2 from the
Tobit estimates for the health  equation are about 0.039 for males and 0.029 for females. The low
correlation between instruments and health and the censoring in the health variable make the
interpretation of these tests difficult. Moreover, according to Staiger and Stock (1996) any version of the27
over-identification tests, regression-based or  Basmann, would be identically affected by the weak
instruments, so the choice between them made no difference.
Although the connection between health status and productivity-wages is shown to be significant
in this section, it is hard to be conclusive about any particular explanation for the observed sectoral
differences. In the next sections, we examine these effects across different population groups. For
example, if older populations are more likely to be sick, the wages of those older individuals may have a
different connection with their health status. Moreover, if the interaction between age, education and
health is important, as previously shown, then this interaction might be especially important when related
to hourly earnings. Given the weak overall regressions for females, we emphasize the discussion of the
results for males. Also, since the selection terms are not found to be significant, the rest of the analysis
omits that variable and focus only on the endogeneity of health.
Evidence by Age Groups
In the section that analyzed health determinants it was found that health outcomes had a different
pattern across different ages. Here, the effects of health on wages are examined by age groups, looking
whether more vulnerable groups of the population have a stronger link between health and wages or
whether age-groups associated with more physical work had a different effect. Table 5 presents the wage
equation estimates for wage earners and self-employed. For each sector, the sample was divided in two
age groups: those aged 16 to 25 years and those aged 26 and older.
We find that, although the size of the health effect may not be robust across age groups, the
previously reported finding of larger effects among the self-employed persists. We find a precise negative
effect among those workers 26 or older of about -2%, while no significant effect was found among those
younger workers. A very similar pattern is found among the self-employed, but the effects on the wages
of older individuals is even stronger: -4.3%. Among females, the pattern is loosely the same, although,
the results are precise only for older wage earners. Clearly, then, it is not the younger group the one
behind the precise and negative effect found on the mean. There are several explanations for this result.
First, younger workers are less likely to be sick, hence, health effects on wages are harder to capture and
this may be a reason for the large standard errors in the estimates. Second, and more importantly, the
reporting bias identified to be stronger among the young, increases the imprecision on the estimates for
this group. Probably due to a combination of these factors, the stronger effects are found among the older
group. Nevertheless, the radical changes in the estimated coefficients for the younger would actually
suggest the inability of the model to capture the variability in their wages and productivity.28
Table 5
Equation for the Log Hourly Earnings for Urban Workers by Age Groups
(t-student in parentheses)
Wage Earners Self Employed
< 26 years >= 26 years < 26 years >= 26 years
Males
1 - Years of schooling (x 10
-2
) 6.161 4.029 * 7.201 4.964
(0.76) (1.72) (0.82) (1.49)
2 - Years of schooling  minus 6  (x 10
-2
) -3.635 2.722 7.524 3.081
-(0.38) (0.87) (0.62) (0.70)
3 - Years of schooling  minus 12  (x 10
-2
) 7.255 * 5.854 ** 0.140 5.321 *
(1.78) (2.53) (0.02) (1.64)
4 - # of days sick-instrumented (x 10
-2
) 1.203 -2.008 ** 0.124 -4.274 **
(1.12) -(2.84) (0.06) -(3.95)
5 - Potential Experience (x 10
-3
) -0.451 25.521 ** -13.668 4.804
-(0.01) (2.78) -(0.20) (0.32)
6 - Potential Experience squared (x 10
-3
) 0.600 -0.175 3.471 0.253
(0.26) -(0.97) (0.80) (0.88)
Number of observations 443 1100 191 953
F-test 4.04 ** 27.16 ** 6.24 ** 14.42 **
R-squared 0.115 0.281 0.171 0.161
Females
1 - Years of schooling (x 10
-2
) 22.475 ** 5.617 * -7.501 8.036 **
(3.70) (1.76) -(0.20) (3.43)
2 - Years of schooling  minus 6  (x 10
-2
) -19.524 ** 3.523 14.596 -2.068
-(2.29) (0.81) (0.34) -(0.54)
3 - Years of schooling  minus 12  (x 10
-2
) 13.298 ** 3.400 0.969 0.784
(2.35) (1.01) (0.08) (0.19)
4 - # of days sick-instrumented(x 10
-2
) -2.510 -2.778 ** -3.484 -2.061
-(1.22) -(2.32) -(0.81) -(1.44)
5 - Potential Experience (x 10
-3
) -43.382 36.388 ** 32.729 15.667
-(0.89) (2.59) (0.30) (0.99)
6 - Potential Experience squared (x 10
-3
) 6.224 * -0.287 -2.491 -0.015
(1.81) -(0.97) -(0.31) -(0.06)
Number of observations 297 547 115 728
F-test 8.90 ** 19.84 ** 1.97 ** 7.93 **
R-squared 0.240 0.347 0.187 0.115
/  see notes to table 4.a.
The age of the individual may not be the only determinant of the connection between health and
productivity. If the relation between health and productivity is related to the nature of the tasks performed,
an exam by the type of job or the contractual nature of the job would be reasonable. In the next part, the
effects of health on wages are distinguished by employment status using the public/private distinction.
Evidence between Public and Private workers
In the previous sub-samples we posed the hypothesis that a stronger health effect was found among
self-employed workers since in this sector health (therefore, productivity) and net income are more closely29
associated. In the wage sector, though, the connection between health and wages depends on the employers’
ability to observe productivity. In this section, we examine a rather different hypothesis. Health premiums in
the public sector might be lower, or even negligible, than in the private sector because of a  different
remuneration policy. Public sector employers may not be incentived to monitor their employees’ effort due to
an objective different from maximizing output, such as keeping employment level constant
16.
Table 6
Equation for the Log Hourly Earnings for Urban Male by type of employment and employer
(t-student in parentheses)
Males Females
W. vs B. Pub vs Priv W. vs B. Pub vs Priv
Individual Human Capital Variables 42.80 ** 75.07 ** 31.34 ** 38.71 **
1 - Years of schooling  (x 10
-2
) 0.048 ** 4.513 ** 8.815 ** 8.140 **
(2.14) (2.02) (3.25) (2.87)
2 - Years of schooling  minus 6 (x 10
-2
) 0.010 2.154 -4.909 -2.688
(0.33) (0.74) -(1.22) -(0.67)
3 - Years of schooling  minus 12  (x 10
-2
) 0.057 ** 6.695 ** 8.670 ** 7.815 **
(2.97) (3.55) (2.91) (2.67)
4 - # of days sick-instrumented (10
-2
) -0.015 ** -1.812 ** -2.499 ** -2.813 **
-(2.52) -(3.25) -(2.45) -(2.57)
Other Individual Characteristics 33.04 ** 41.84 ** 26.20 ** 22.56 **
5 - Potential Experience 0.028 ** 0.032 ** 0.037 ** 0.033 **
(5.11) (5.74) (4.63) (4.13)
6 - Potential Experience squared (x 10
-3
) -0.269 ** -0.304 ** -0.337 * -0.237
-(2.15) -(2.46) -(1.73) -(1.22)
Occupation Variables 6.22 ** 8.87 ** 8.68 ** 4.63 **




13 - Blue collar dummy -0.051 -0.093
-(0.47) -(0.58)
14 - Number of days sick of a public worker 0.021 ** 0.016 **
(3.56) (2.04)
15 - Public worker dummy 0.220 ** 0.336 **
(2.11) (2.92)
Number of obs 1543 1543 844 844
F( 21,  1521) 37.34 36.82 30.55 32.26
R-squared 0.290 0.291 0.371 0.360
Net effect on health (x 10
-2
) -0.911 0.305 -1.078 -1.212
-(1.48) (0.46) -(0.81) -(1.13)
/  see notes to table 4.a.
We examine these differences between the public and private sector. In addition, we distinguish
between blue collar and white collar workers, in order to examine the alternative (but not exclusive) argument
                                               
16. Moreover, recent labor market deregulation might have strengthen the connection between productivity and
wages in Peru, but the added flexibility has been more difficult to implement in the public sector.30
that health has a stronger impact among those performing more physically demanding tasks. The estimated
equation is
17:





where JOBTYPE  is an indicator that takes the value of 1 if the worker is in the public sector (blue-collar
worker). The results for this exercise for wage earners are shown in Table 6. The column labeled 1 shows
that no substantial difference exists between the effects among blue and white collared workers, males or
females. This evidence is against the physically-demanding-job type of argument, if the blue and white
collared workers are reporting without error. The second column shows some significant differences
between public and private workers. The estimated effect of (negative) health among private male
workers is –1.8% lower productivity, while the net effect among public workers (shown at the bottom of
the table) is not different from zero among males. The same pattern is found among females. It must be
emphasized that the “public worker” effect is not due to firm size, since that effect has already been
controlled for.
Another way to characterize these effects is by examining them across the wage distribution,
which is pursued next.
Health effects over the wage distribution
Instead of analyzing different health effects among specific types of employment or employer,
here we look at differences in health effects over the wage distribution. It is not unreasonable to think that
low paid jobs imply a stronger connection between health and productivity (therefore, wages), for
instance, due to more physically demanding tasks. To avoid splitting the sample by wage groups, we
follow Buchinsky (1994) and estimate a quantile regression. The quantile regression model is
y x u i i i = + 'bq q (12)
where  q  denotes the log wage quantile being estimated, and   xi'bq  denotes the   q
th quantile. The
parameters for the health status variables are interpreted as the effects on the  q
th quantile of ln(wage),
not on the mean ln(wage) as in the OLS case. Conditional on  xi'bq this is equivalent to examine the q
th
quantile of the residual  i uq . In this study we evaluate the effects on the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th
percentiles. This instrument is useful for several reasons. First, it provides information about the effects at
each part of the wage distribution, so it is possible to describe changes in the wage distribution when a
                                               
17. We are aware of the problems associated to selectivity biases. We could try a fully specified participation
equation with separate wage regressions for each sector. This method, though,  would require additional identifiying
instruments which are generally difficult to obtain.31
bad health shock occurs, using the Inter-quartile Range (IQR) as an estimate of the wage variance
(inequality). Second, the quantile estimator, when computed at the 50th percentile, provides the least
absolute deviation (LAD) estimator, which is more robust than the OLS estimator in the presence of
outliers.
The results are shown in Tables 7.a to 7.b for wage earners and self-employed, respectively. In
each table, the top panel shows the results for males and the bottom for females. Before discussing the
health effects it must be observed that returns to primary schooling are larger among the lower wage tail
for wage earners. As before, returns to secondary schooling are not any different from primary schooling.
On the other hand, the premium to higher education are larger for those around the third quartile. Note
also that the returns to potential experience is lowered among the top quartile. Corresponding estimates
for the self-employed are less precise.
Table 7.a shows that the effects of bad health shocks on wages are larger for those males at the
bottom of the distribution (-2.6% at the 10th percentile). This result implies more vulnerability of lower
wage males to negative shocks in health. That is, if a weather shock implies one more day of illness for all
males, the wages of the poor would decrease the most. On the more positive note, though, this result
would imply that a health policy that result in a positive health shock among male workers would be
effective in reducing wage inequality, as measured as the log variance of wages, even if the government’s
program has some targeting inefficiencies
18. Among the self-employed, the results show the same
decreasing pattern for the health effects up to the median (from –3.8% at the lowest decile to –0.9% at the
median). These effects increase for the upper tail, although they are still lower than those found for the
lowest decile.
The results for females, however, show the reverse pattern. The largest health effects are found
among the top of the log wage distribution. And this finding is similar in both sectors but accentuated
among wage earners.
While the result for males somewhat supports the hypothesis of physical tasks associated to lower
paid jobs, the results for females only indicates that a different explanation is needed. For example, if high
wage earning females do depend more on their health statuses it would be reasonable to expect larger
effects around the top of the distribution. Still, there are other possible explanations. One is associated to
the limitations of our (negative) health indicator. As lower paid jobs have more observations with
uncensored morbidity, measuring health effects is more accurate with them than in the higher wage
                                               
18. Clearly, the program’s impact on wage inequality would be even larger if targeted exclusively among all
the poor. The point we make here is that, such a health program would reduce wage inequality, even if some
filtering occurs; actually, even if filtering reaches its maximum.32
range
19. In a similar way, self reported measures might be more systematically biased among top earning
females than among those with low wages.
Notice that, as in all previous estimations, health effects are found to be larger among the self-
employed than among wage earners, but the difference is not clear here for females.
Table 7.a
Equation for the Log Hourly Earnings for Urban Male Wage Earners over the Wage Distribution
(t-student in parentheses)
10 25 50 75 90
Males
1 - Years of schooling (x 10
-2
) 7.200 ** 5.592 * 8.066 ** 3.708 0.712
(2.20) (1.58) (3.23) (1.00) (0.12)
2 - Years of schooling  minus 6  (x 10
-2
) -0.723 0.915 -3.488 1.529 5.975
-(0.18) (0.22) -(0.92) (0.39) (0.96)
3 - Years of schooling  minus 12  (x 10
-2
) 5.040 ** 6.468 ** 7.042 ** 8.813 ** 6.664 **
(1.83) (3.59) (2.94) (4.11) (2.31)
4 - # of days sick-instrumented  (x 10
-2
) -2.619 ** -1.471 ** -1.469 ** -0.866 -0.436
-(3.79) -(1.91) -(2.31) -(1.32) -(0.43)
5 - Potential Experience 0.047 ** 0.035 ** 0.032 ** 0.029 ** 0.031 **
(5.25) (5.48) (7.22) (4.79) (3.31)
6 - Potential Experience squared (x 10
-3
) -0.577 -0.339 ** -0.326 ** -0.268 ** -0.366 *
-(2.92) -(2.14) -(3.13) -(2.00) -(1.69)
Number of observations 1543 1543 1543 1543 1543
R-squared 0.167 0.180 0.174 0.174 0.167
Females
1 - Years of schooling (x 10
-2) 13.754 ** 11.812 ** 4.833 3.659 9.432 **
(2.74) (3.03) (1.22) (0.97) (2.80)
2 - Years of schooling  minus 6  (x 10
-2
) -9.809 -4.298 1.058 1.071 -6.089
-(1.43) -(0.79) (0.17) (0.17) -(1.19)
3 - Years of schooling  minus 12  (x 10
-2
) 12.522 ** 6.939 ** 8.147 ** 7.487 ** 7.665 *
(2.15) (1.97) (2.44) (1.80) (1.72)
4 - # of days sick-instrumented  (x 10
-2
) -0.860 -2.134 -2.877 ** -3.868 ** -3.610 **
-(0.33) -(1.44) -(2.46) -(2.56) -(2.20)
5 - Potential Experience 0.043 ** 0.039 ** 0.032 ** 0.035 ** 0.022 *
(2.93) (4.85) (4.06) (2.78) (1.53)
6 - Potential Experience squared (x 10
-3
) -0.499 -0.252 -0.211 -0.199 0.067
-(1.40) -(1.10) -(1.06) -(0.72) (0.23)
Number of observations 844 844 844 844 844
R-squared 0.222 0.250 0.255 0.205 0.164
/  see notes to table 4.a.
                                               
19. This result could also be generated if public workers were clustered around the upper tail. We checked the
robustness of the pattern over the wage distribution to the inclusion of the indicator variables for the public sector.
We found that the effects on public workers is equally insignificant and close to zero across the distribution, while
the effects on private workers mimic those reported in this section. In sum, it is the private sector workers who are
driving the results across the distribution, corroborating the finding that among public sector workers health status
has less of an impact on wages.33
Table 7.b
Equation for the Log Hourly Earnings for Urban Self Employed by wage distribution
(t-student in parentheses)
10 25 50 75 90
Males
1 - Years of schooling (x 10
-2
) 1.376 2.559 4.726 7.289 ** 9.531
(0.23) (0.72) (1.28) (2.04) (1.29)
2 - Years of schooling  minus 6  (x 10
-2
) 8.936 6.995 * 3.813 0.730 0.105
(0.96) (1.76) (0.84) (0.18) (0.01)
3 - Years of schooling  minus 12  (x 10
-2
) -0.682 3.893 4.871 9.116 ** 7.479
-(0.11) (1.25) (1.37) (4.04) (1.19)
4 - # of days sick-instrumented (x 10
-2
) -3.752 ** -2.147 ** -0.930 -2.225 * -3.160 **
-(2.00) -(2.25) -(1.08) -(1.82) -(2.75)
5 - Potential Experience 0.027 * 0.029 ** 0.032 ** 0.025 * 0.022
(1.80) (2.15) (3.59) (1.76) (0.80)
6 - Potential Experience squared (x 10
-3
) -0.321 -0.256 -0.303 0.026 0.201
-(0.86) -(0.87) -(1.53) (0.08) (0.41)
Number of observations 1144 1144 1144 1144 1144
R-squared 0.099 0.089 0.104 0.107 0.104
Females
1 - Years of schooling (x 10
-2) 3.718 6.604 * 7.101 ** 5.939 ** 8.962 **
(0.70) (1.80) (2.81) (3.01) (2.83)
2 - Years of schooling  minus 6  (x 10
-2
) 3.331 -0.114 -1.203 2.026 0.530
(0.43) -(0.02) -(0.35) (0.64) (0.09)
3 - Years of schooling  minus 12  (x 10
-2
) 1.808 -3.233 2.636 5.488 1.066
(0.24) -(0.48) (0.52) (1.13) (0.18)
4 - # of days sick-instrumented (x 10
-2
) -2.047 -2.275 -3.239 ** -3.117 * -2.016
-(0.98) -(0.89) -(2.13) -(1.76) -(0.78)
5 - Potential Experience 0.038 * 0.044 ** 0.029 ** 0.029 ** 0.018
(1.73) (2.66) (2.34) (2.78) (1.18)
6 - Potential Experience squared (x 10
-3
) -0.288 -0.460 ** -0.254 -0.105 0.136
-(0.99) -(1.90) -(1.38) -(0.47) (0.55)
Number of observations 843 843 843 843 843
R-squared 0.096 0.064 0.067 0.079 0.098
/  see notes to table 4.a.
6.  Summary
This report evaluated the effects of health on wages by using different samples and different
statistical methods. The findings on health determinants measured as the number of days sick are
reasonably interesting for urban males. First, we do not find evidence of non-linearities in the relationship
between age and health, a result that differs from several previous studies. A possible explanation is our
decision to limit our analysis to adult individuals (ages between 16 and 60). Schooling appears as a very
important determinant of health status, and its importance does increase with age. This result appears very
robust for this sample. It does differs from previous estimates such as Strauss, et.al., 1993, but that is most34
likely explained by the use of a self-reported health measure here, compared to the  anthropometric
measure used by them.
For younger males, a rural background tends to be correlated with poorer health status, apparently
due to poorer environmental and/or  economic conditions, but the relationship reverses for older
individuals. The positive effect of the rural background on the health of males older than 48 would
suggest that the key explanatory factor is the economic condition of the individual as a child. Finally, for
all the sub-samples (urban/rural, male/female) the group of proposed instruments seem to be significant
determinants of the health status of Peruvian individuals, a result that allows us to look rather confidently
to the second stage, the effect of health on wages.
Our key result is that health status is positively and robustly associated with wages, especially for
urban males. Table 8 summarizes the main results of this paper. First, health effects are found to be
stronger for self-employed than among male wage earners, and that was attributed to the difficulty of
employers to observe individual productivity. Second, health effects are weak and negligible among
younger individuals, emphasizing the importance of reporting biases among the young in the morbidity
indicator used here. For these two effects, imprecision in the estimates obtained for females does not
allow to add any information on this issue. Third, the larger effects found among self-employed and the
negligible effects found among public workers suggest that the effects on wages are larger in jobs where
productivity and wages are closely connected, either by observability or by the design of the remuneration
policy. Finally, when examining the effects across the wage distribution, the largest effects are found at
the bottom of the wage distribution of both wage earners and self-employed males. A result that cannot be
explained is that the reverse pattern is found among females.
Non-linear health effects on productivity were not found in previous versions of this paper, and
given the censoring degree of the health indicator, the treatment of non-linearities turned out to be a
difficult task by itself. The need of more and better information of health status, such as objective
measures of health, is evidenced in the paper, since it would enable to separate much of the noise in the
self-reported health status variable. A recent paper by Dow, et. al. (1997) evidenced how self-reported
health measures would be biased. Using experimental data from the US and Indonesia, they find that self-
reported health measures change significantly as a result of changes in, for instance, health service prices,
while objective measures remain unchanged.
The key caveat in the analysis presented here is the overall inability to explain the relationship
between health, productivity and wages among females. In that sense, it would be important for future
research to concentrate on the way women insert themselves into the labor market, that is in the
determinants of their participation in the labor market, in the sectors and occupations that they choose,35
etc. Previous to that, though, it would also be important to validate the findings here with the use of less
subjective health indicators, such as anthropometric measures.
Table 8: Summary of Health Effects on Hourly Earnings
Male Female
Wage-earners Self-employed Wage-earners Self-employed
Full sample -1.22% ** -3.15% ** -2.41% ** -2.29% *
-(2.23) -(3.24) -(2.32) -(1.70)
Young 1.20% 0.12% -2.51% -3.48% **
(1.12) (0.06) -(1.22) -(0.81)
Old -2.01% ** -4.27% ** -2.78% ** -2.06%
-(2.84) -(3.95) -(2.32) -(1.44)
Quintile 10 -2.62% ** -3.75% ** -0.86% -2.05%
-(3.79) -(2.00) -(0.33) -(0.98)
Quintile 25 -1.47% ** -2.15% ** -2.13% -2.28%
-(1.91) -(2.25) -(1.44) -(0.89)
Quintile 50 (median) -1.47% ** -0.93% -2.88% ** -3.24% **
-(2.31) -(1.08) -(2.46) -(2.13)
Quintile 75 -0.87% -2.23% * -3.87% ** -3.12% *
-(1.32) -(1.82) -(2.56) -(1.76)
Quintile 90 -0.44% -3.16% ** -3.61% ** -2.02%
-(0.43) -(2.75) -(2.20) -(0.78)
Public 0.30% -1.21%
(0.46) -(1.13)
Private -1.81% ** -2.81% **
-(3.25) -(2.57)
/  Numbers in parentheses are the t-statistics.
This paper, however, allowed other interesting findings regarding the relationship between health
and education. Returns to primary schooling were slightly reduced when instrumented health measures
were added into the wage equation, suggesting that, when health is omitted, part of the educational effect
on wages is due to the increased health and its associated productivity. This finding offers a window of
opportunity for public health policy. The potential effects of better health are significant, but are
especially large among those less endowed with human capital and hence earning lower wages. In this
sense, public health policies might have effects not considered in traditional program evaluations that
should be accounted for to support these programs. Moreover, if policy-makers consider health as a
relevant human capital measure, health packages could be considered as part of the programs designed to
reduce poverty or improve the living conditions. Overweighing education as the single human capital
variable and not taking proper care of health outcomes may lead to wrong targeting of development and
income programs for the less favored individuals in Peru.36
7.  References
Amemiya, T. (1985). Advanced Econometrics. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press.
Anderson Schaffner, Julie (1998) “Premiums to Employment in Larger Establishments: Evidence from
Peru,” Journal of Development Economics, 55 (1), pp. 81-113, February.
Becker, Gary (1965).  "A Theory of the Allocation of Time". The Economic Journal LXXX (200): 493-
517, September.
Behrman, Jere and A. Deolalikar (1988). “Health and Nutrition”. In Chenery H. and T. N. Srinivasan
(eds.), Handbook of Development Economics 1: 631-711. New York, North Holland.
Birdsall, Nancy (1996). “Public Spending on Higher Education in Developing Countries: Too Much or
Too Little?”. In Economics of Education Review 15 (4): 407-419, October.
Borjas, George (1994).  ”Assimilation and Changes in Cohort Quality Revisited: What Happened to
Inmigrant Earnings in the 1980s”. NBER Working Paper # 4866, Cambridge, September.
Buchinsky, Moshe (1994). “Changes in the U.S. wage structure 1963-1987: Application of  quantile
regression”. In Econometrica 62 (2): 405-458, March.
Dow, W., P. Gertler, R-F Schoeni, J. Strauss and D. Thomas (1997). “Health Care Prices, Health and
Labor Outcomes: Experimental Evidence”.  Labor and Population Program, RAND Corporation.
Grosh, Margaret and Paul Gleewe (1995). “A Guide to Living Standard Measurement Study Surveys and
Their Data Sets”. The World Bank, Living Standard Measurement Survey Working Paper # 120,
Washington, DC., September.
Hausman, J. (1983) “Specification and Estimation of Simultaneous Equation Models.” In Z. Griliches,
and M. Intriligator, eds., Handbook of Econometrics, Amsterdam: North Holland.
Lee, Lung-Fei (1983) “Generalized Econometric Models with Selectivity,” Econometrica, 51 (3): 507-
512, May.
............... (1982). “Some approaches to the Correction of Selectivity Bias,” Review of Economic Studies,
49:355-372, .
............... (1981). “Simultaneous Equation Models with Discrete and Censored Dependent Variables”. In
Manski and  McFadden (eds.),  Structural Analysis of Discrete Data with Econometric
Applications, Boston, MIT Press.
Maddala, G.S. (1983). “Limited-dependent and qualitative variables in econometrics”. New York,
Cambridge University Press.
Mincer, Jacob (1962). “On-the-job Training: Costs, Returns and Some Implications”. In  Journal of
Political Economy 70 (5): s50-s79, October.37
Mincer, J. and S. Polachek (1974). “Family Investments in Human Capital: Earnings of Women”. In Journal
of Political Economy 82(2), part2: S76-S108.
Moulton, Brent (1986): "Random Group Effects and the Precision of Regression Estimates", Journal of
Econometrics 32: 385-397.
-------------- (1990): "An Illustration of a Pitfall in Estimating the Effects of Aggregate Variables on Micro
Units", The Review of Economics and Statistics: .
Pitt, Mark and Mark Rosenzweig (1986). “Agricultural Prices, Food Consumption, and the Health and
Productivity of Indonesian Farmers”. In Singh, Squire and Strauss (eds),  “Agricultural
Household Models: Extensions, Applications and Policy”. A World Bank Publication, John
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, February.
Powell, James (1986). “Symmetrically Trimmed Least Squares Estimation of  Tobit Models”. In
Econometrica 54 (6): 1435-1460, November.
-------------- (1984). “Least Absolute Deviations Estimation for the Censored Regression Model”. In
Journal of Econometrics 25(?): 303-325, .
Saavedra, Jaime (1997). “Quiénes ganan y Quiénes Pierden con una Reforma Estructural: Cambios en la
Dispersión de Ingresos Según Educación, Experiencia y Género en el Perú Urbano”. In Notas
para el Debate # 14: 9-77, August.
Schultz, Paul T. and Aysit Tansel (1997). “Wage and labor supply effects of illness in Côte d’Ivoire and
Ghana: instrumental variable estimates for days disabled”. In Journal of Development Economics,
53 (2), pp. 251-286, August.
Staiger, Douglas and James Stock (1997). “Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak Instruments”.
In Econometrica 65 (3): 557-586, May.
Strauss, John and Duncan Thomas (1995). “Human resources: Empirical modeling of household and
family decisions”. In J.  Behrman and  T.N.  Srinivasan (eds.),  Handbook of Development
Economics, Vol. 3: 1883-2023, North-Holland Press, Amsterdam.
Strauss, John; Paul Gertler, Omar Rahman and Kristin Fox (1993). “Gender and Life-Cycle Differentials
in the Patterns and Determinants of Adult Health”. In The Journal of Human Resources28(4):
791-837, Fall.
Thomas, Duncan and John Strauss (1997). “Health and wages: Evidence on men and women in urban
Brazil”. In Journal of Econometrics 77 (1): 159-186, March.
Valdivia, Martín and Miguel Robles (1997). “Decisiones Laborales en las Economías Rurales del Perú”.
In Notas para el Debate # 14: 79-131, GRADE, Lima, September.38
Appendix A
Table A.1
Health Determinants for urban adults by gender: Illness vs. Disability
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Male Females
Variables illness Disability Illness disability
Individual Characteristics 84.44 ** 21.7 ** 110.51 ** 35.62 **
1 - Age 0.678 ** 0.364 ** 0.242 ** 0.008
(5.70) (2.82) (2.96) (0.10)
2 - Years of schooling 1.345 ** 0.651 -0.235 -0.621 **
(3.07) (1.20) -(0.68) -(1.87)
3 - Schooling x Age (x 10
-2) -4.041 ** -2.374 * -0.063 1.026
-(3.57) -(1.73) -(0.08) (1.41)
4 - Rural migrant 11.184 ** 2.849 -1.805 -6.422 **
(3.43) (0.66) -(0.53) -(2.26)
5 - Rural migrant x Age -0.225 ** -0.042 0.073 0.135 **
-(2.90) -(0.41) (0.85) (1.98)
Household Assets Variables 5.27 4.44 0.73 1.24
6 - Non-Labor Income (x 10
-2) 12.393 9.078 5.540 -0.088
(1.16) (0.69) (0.64) -(0.01)
7 - Nonproductive assets -0.071 -0.360 ** 0.043 -0.041
-(0.38) -(1.90) (0.25) -(0.25)
8 - Home business 2.340 ** 0.809 0.495 0.947
(2.01) (0.50) (0.51) (1.09)
Infrastructure Variables 6.97 ** 2.24 7.76 ** 5.03 *
9 - Adequate ceiling -2.935 ** -1.574 -2.978 ** -2.018 **
-(2.49) -(1.06) -(2.75) -(2.14)
10 - Adequate floors -0.440 -1.287 0.543 -0.379
-(0.37) -(0.89) (0.45) -(0.40)
Community Variables 1.22 1.83 1.65 1.07
11 - Distance time to health service 1.619 3.630 -2.810 1.268
(0.46) (1.31) -(1.22) (0.82)
12 - Waiting time to medical attention 1.216 -0.627 -0.362 -0.630
(0.98) -(0.46) -(0.33) -(0.66)
Price Variables 4.32 4.67 13.35 ** 1.81
13 - Potato price 6.410 ** 7.609 * 4.532 0.995
(2.07) (1.82) (1.23) (0.41)
14 - Milk price 3.014 -5.555 13.083 ** 4.450
(0.70) -(0.85) (3.51) (1.33)39
(continuation of table A.1) Male Females
Variables illness disability illness disability
Regional Controls 35.79 ** 3.65 66.99 ** 10.91 **
15 - Costa 9.066 ** -0.241 11.790 ** 4.865
(3.91) -(0.10) (5.90) (2.98) **
16 - Other sierra 7.820 ** 0.870 9.324 ** 3.038 **
(3.57) (0.41) (4.79) (2.14)
17 - Sierra sur 13.002 ** 2.457 15.325 ** 3.591 *
(5.92) (0.80) (7.58) (1.83)
18 - Selva alta 5.024 ** 3.187 10.216 ** 3.455 *
(2.09) (1.12) (3.97) (1.80)
19 - Selva baja 5.899 ** -1.469 8.728 ** 1.225
(2.04) -(0.42) (3.11) (0.49)
20 - May 26.582 ** 19.412 13.337 ** 6.974
(1.84) (1.57) * (7.76) (1.03)
21 - June 3.874 -1.117 3.788 ** 3.026 *
(1.56) -(0.59) (2.13) (1.59)
22 - July 0.881 -5.739 ** 1.947 2.011
(0.35) -(2.64) (1.12) (1.01)
23 - Constant -57.115 ** -27.053 ** -48.561 ** -24.068 **
-(5.81) -(2.12) -(5.64) -(3.15)
Log Likelihood -3407.65 -1314.61 -4883.92 -2179.53
Global Chi-squared 274.23 ** 89.70 ** 284.36 ** 79.35 **
Number of observations 3102 3102 3508 3508
(*) Statistically significant at 10% level of confidence.
(**) Statistically significant at 5% level of confidence.40
Table A.2
Health Determinants for Peruvian urban males: Alternative dependent variables
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Male Female
Variables Probit Week-ill Day-ill Probit Week-ill Day-ill
Individual Characteristics 73.46 ** 87.29 ** 84.44 ** 117.71 ** 110.91 ** 110.51 **
1 - Age 0.038 ** 0.684 ** 0.678 ** 0.019 0.241 0.242 **
(5.46) (5.70) (5.70) (3.96) (2.89) (2.96)
2 - Years of schooling 0.078 ** 1.364 ** 1.345 ** 0.012 -0.250 -0.235
(2.95) (3.08) (3.07) (0.60) -(0.71) -(0.68)
3 - Schooling x Age (x 10
-2
) -0.220 ** -4.059 ** -4.041 ** -0.055 -0.038 -0.063
-(3.36) -(3.55) -(3.57) -(1.22) -(0.05) -(0.08)
4 - Rural migrant 0.681 ** 11.624 ** 11.184 ** -0.144 -1.660 -1.805
(3.24) (3.57) (3.43) -(0.66) -(0.48) -(0.53)
5 - Rural migrant x Age -0.015 ** -0.234 ** -0.225 ** 0.005 0.069 0.073
-(2.89) -(2.99) -(2.90) (0.92) (0.79) (0.85)
Household Assets Variables 5.81 5.56 5.27 1.49 0.56 0.73
6 - Non-Labor Income (x 10
-2
) 0.870 12.788 12.393 0.230 5.285 5.540
(1.26) (1.18) (1.16) (0.42) (0.60) (0.64)
7 - Nonproductive assets -0.004 -0.069 -0.071 0.000 0.020 0.043
-(0.41) -(0.38) -(0.38) (0.02) (0.12) (0.25)
8 - Home business 0.143 ** 2.410 ** 2.340 ** 0.070 0.430 0.495
(2.20) (2.07) (2.01) (1.20) (0.43) (0.51)
Infrastructure Variables 6.54 ** 6.86 ** 6.97 ** 7.7 7.19 7.76 **
9 - Adequate ceiling -0.159 ** -2.934 ** -2.935 ** -0.175 -2.894 -2.978 **
-(2.29) -(2.48) -(2.49) -(2.75) -(2.66) -(2.75)
10 - Adequate floors -0.044 -0.412 -0.440 0.009 0.501 0.543
-(0.56) -(0.35) -(0.37) (0.12) (0.42) (0.45)
Community Variables 1.55 1.28 1.22 3.89 1.68 1.65
11 - Distance time to health service 0.037 1.708 1.619 -0.297 -2.766 -2.810
(0.17) (0.48) (0.46) -(1.97) -(1.20) -(1.22)
12 - Waiting time to medical attention 0.090 1.244 1.216 0.003 -0.450 -0.362
(1.23) (1.00) (0.98) (0.05) -(0.41) -(0.33)
Price Variables 6.96 4.35 4.32 14.21 13.36 13.35 **
13 - Potato price 0.463 ** 6.568 ** 6.410 ** 0.257 4.831 4.532
(2.59) (2.09) (2.07) (1.07) (1.33) (1.23)
14 - Milk price 0.256 2.745 3.014 0.853 12.909 13.083 **
(0.93) (0.62) (0.70) (3.72) (3.49) (3.51)
Regional Controls 60.26 ** 36.23 ** 35.79 ** 56.64 67.12 66.99 **
15 - Costa 0.564 ** 9.154 ** 9.066 ** 0.653 11.756 11.790 **
(4.21) (3.94) (3.91) (5.20) (5.91) (5.90)
16 - Other sierra 0.529 ** 7.893 ** 7.820 ** 0.505 9.414 9.324 **
(3.94) (3.55) (3.57) (4.15) (4.86) (4.79)
17 - Sierra sur 0.888 ** 13.236 ** 13.002 ** 0.851 15.514 15.325 **
(7.57) (5.95) (5.92) (7.07) (7.67) (7.58)
18 - Selva alta 0.281 ** 5.167 ** 5.024 ** 0.511 10.225 10.216 **
(2.13) (2.09) (2.09) (2.65) (3.96) (3.97)
19 - Selva baja 0.334 ** 6.012 ** 5.899 ** 0.512 8.736 8.728 **
(2.08) (2.04) (2.04) (3.15) (3.07) (3.11)
20 - May 0.468 25.423 * 26.582 ** 0.960 13.401 13.337 **
(0.89) (1.68) (1.84) (5.71) (7.38) (7.76)
21 - June 0.265 * 3.731 3.874 0.234 3.979 3.788 **
(1.83) (1.48) (1.56) (2.09) (2.22) (2.13)41
(continuation of table A.2) Male Female
Variables Probit Week-ill Day-ill Probit Week-ill Day-ill
22 - July 0.123 0.735 0.881 0.097 2.099 1.947
(0.86) (0.29) (0.35) (0.88) (1.20) (1.12)
23 - Constant -3.599 ** -57.469 ** -57.115 ** -3.143 -48.431 -48.561 **
-(6.28) -(5.75) -(5.81) -(6.13) -(5.65) -(5.64)
Log Likelihood -1423.12 -2388.69 -3407.65 -1912.18 -3371.23 -4883.92
Global Chi-squared 273.52 ** 273.40 ** 274.23 ** 369.43 283.91 284.36 **
Number of observations 3094 3102 3102 3493 3508 3508
(*) Statistically significant at 10% level of confidence.
(**) Statistically significant at 5% level of confidence.Table A.3
Health Determinants for urban adults by gender: Life-cycle effects
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Male Females
Variables Full Sample Young Mature Old Full Sample Young
Individual Characteristics 84.44 ** 16.65 ** 7.64 7.28 110.51 **
1 - Age 0.678 ** 1.485 ** 0.815 0.083 0.242 ** -0.094
(5.70) (2.15) (1.40) (0.16) (2.96) -(0.20)
2 - Years of schooling 1.345 ** 3.303 ** 1.660 -1.310 -0.235 -0.729
(3.07) (2.18) (0.92) -(0.43) -(0.68) -(0.67)
3 - Schooling x Age (x 10
-2
) -4.041 ** -0.129 ** -0.047 0.011 -0.063 0.023
-(3.57) -(2.05) -(1.00) (0.19) -(0.08) (0.51)
4 - Rural migrant 11.184 ** 11.919 9.208 -9.848 -1.805 -9.961
(3.43) (1.20) (0.64) -(0.39) -(0.53) -(0.91)
5 - Rural migrant x Age -0.225 ** -0.262 -0.180 0.148 0.073 0.407
-(2.90) -(0.66) -(0.48) (0.32) (0.85) (0.91)
Household Assets Variables 5.27 8.76 2.60 5.52 0.73
6 - Non-Labor Income (x 10
-2
) 12.393 0.344 -0.275 0.081 5.540 0.179
(1.16) (2.44) -(1.42) (0.31) (0.64) (1.46)
7 - Nonproductive assets -0.071 0.137 -0.100 -0.075 0.043 -0.167
-(0.38) (0.60) -(0.36) -(0.18) (0.25) -(0.57)
8 - Home business 2.340 ** 1.831 1.325 5.982 ** 0.495 0.020
(2.01) (1.15) (0.79) (2.29) (0.51) (0.02)
Infrastructure Variables 6.97 ** 0.51 3.98 5.75 ** 7.76 **
9 - Adequate ceiling -2.935 ** -1.014 -3.282 * -6.897 ** -2.978 ** -3.091
-(2.49) -(0.64) -(1.68) -(2.39) -(2.75) -(2.26)
10 - Adequate floors -0.440 -0.240 -0.963 0.400 0.543 0.355
-(0.37) -(0.15) -(0.43) (0.14) (0.45) (0.25)
Community Variables 1.22 1.83 1.88 1.23 1.65
11 - Distance time to health service 1.619 -2.034 4.681 7.015 -2.810 -4.396
(0.46) -(0.89) (0.77) (1.09) -(1.22) -(1.26)
12 - Waiting time to medical attention 1.216 1.548 1.887 0.389 -0.362 -1.844
(0.98) (1.16) (1.21) (0.18) -(0.33) -(1.37)43
(continuation of table A.3) Male
Variables Full Sample Young Mature Old Full Sample Young
Price Variables 4.32 0.24 5.33 8.91 13.35 ** 11.57
13 - Potato price 6.410 ** 1.923 9.139 ** 14.318 ** 4.532 6.476
(2.07) (0.48) (2.19) (2.32) (1.23) (1.39)
14 - Milk price 3.014 1.981 -1.554 12.421 ** 13.083 ** 13.667
(0.70) (0.29) -(0.31) (2.01) (3.51) (3.05)
Regional Controls 35.79 ** 23.19 ** 21.15 ** 19.54 ** 66.99 ** 41.13
15 - Coast 9.066 ** 8.364 ** 6.394 ** 14.196 ** 11.790 ** 13.167
(3.91) (3.11) (2.01) (3.87) (5.90) (5.27)
16 - Other Sierra 7.820 ** 6.902 ** 6.796 ** 10.052 ** 9.324 ** 9.720
(3.57) (3.03) (2.22) (2.40) (4.79) (4.27)
17 - Sierra sur 13.002 ** 11.828 ** 11.942 ** 16.769 ** 15.325 ** 15.074
(5.92) (4.44) (4.02) (3.91) (7.58) (5.74)
18 - Selva alta 5.024 ** 4.764 * 3.466 6.431 10.216 ** 9.934
(2.09) (1.83) (1.04) (1.52) (3.97) (3.30)
19 - Selva baja 5.899 ** 8.651 ** 2.977 2.174 8.728 ** 5.946
(2.04) (2.33) (0.82) (0.45) (3.11) (1.80)
20 - May 26.582 ** -70.246 ** 132.264 ** 13.845 ** 13.337 ** 16.328
(1.84) -(8.84) (12.99) (2.05) (7.76) (2.51)
21 - June 3.874 5.933 ** 8.063 ** -5.765 3.788 ** 5.448
(1.56) (2.24) (3.05) -(1.09) (2.13) (2.21)
22 - July 0.881 3.712 5.392 ** -10.273 * 1.947 4.181
(0.35) (1.35) (2.44) -(1.83) (1.12) (1.63)
23 - Constant -57.115 ** -71.636 ** -62.271 ** -42.547 -48.561 ** -40.459
-(5.81) -(3.42) -(2.37) -(1.45) -(5.64) -(2.59)
Log Likelihood -3407.65 -1404.98 -1152.85 -822.81 -4883.92 -2079.05
Global Chi-squared 274.23 ** 86.94 ** 84.42 ** 96.44 ** 284.36 ** 98.57
Number of observations 3102 1548 963 591 3508
(*) Statistically significant at 10% level of confidence.
(**) Statistically significant at 5% level of confidence.Appendix B
Table B.1: Descriptive Statistics of the Peruvian Urban Population
Total Population Male Population
Total Male Female Unemployed Wage Earners Self Employed Unemployed
Sample size 6610 3102 3508
Labor force participation (%) 40.3 45.1 22.6 23.3 45.1 31.6 55.4
Dependent Health Variables
Days sick 2.322 1.885 2.709 1.752 1.590 2.403 2.605
(0.072) (0.096) (0.106) (0.203) (0.126) (0.190) (0.142)
Hourly Income Variables /a
Last 12 months 3.157 4.147
(0.113) (0.257)
Last 7 days 3.111 4.190
(0.109) (0.271)
Individual Variables
Age (in years) 32.818 32.800 32.834 23.830 33.676 38.171 31.662
(0.153) (0.225) (0.208) (0.413) (0.302) (0.372) (0.302)
Tenure (in years) 4.345 5.901 2.969 1.028 6.723 8.324 1.038
(0.087) (0.145) (0.098) (0.119) (0.208) (0.297) (0.093)
Years of schooling 9.920 10.401 9.495 10.436 10.874 9.700 9.203
(0.050) (0.067) (0.073) (0.115) (0.102) (0.128) (0.092)
Primary education dummy 0.196 0.169 0.221 0.086 0.151 0.255 0.223
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.009)
Secondary education dummy 0.489 0.517 0.465 0.604 0.496 0.482 0.515
(0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.018) (0.013) (0.016) (0.011)
High education dummy 0.275 0.297 0.255 0.289 0.340 0.242 0.206
(0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.017) (0.013) (0.014) (0.009)
Rural migrant 0.213 0.211 0.214 0.080 0.221 0.300 0.200
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.015) (0.009)
Public worker dummy 0.092 0.113 0.074 0.007 0.239 0.010
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.011) (0.003)
Blue collar worker dummy 0.159 0.255 0.075 0.032 0.513 0.050
(0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.007) (0.013) (0.007)46
Total Population Male Population
Total Male Female Unemployed Wage Earners Self Employed Unemployed
Firm Size Variables
Micro scale firm dummy 0.119 0.121 0.115 0.156 0.046
(0.323) (0.327) (0.319) (0.363) (0.210)
Small scale firm dummy 0.087 0.083 0.094 0.127 0.015
(0.282) (0.275) (0.291) (0.333) (0.123)
Medium scale firm dummy 0.180 0.207 0.138 0.327 0.027
(0.384) (0.406) (0.345) (0.469) (0.161)
Large scale firm dummy 0.047 0.052 0.039 0.083 0.008
(0.211) (0.222) (0.193) (0.276) (0.090)
Income Variables
Rents + Transfers /a 29.847 24.176 34.862 37.982 20.741 18.891 37.431
(0.848) (1.118) (1.249) (2.804) (1.403) (2.013) (1.759)
Non productive stock  /a 32095 32366 31856 50611 24879 29597 33871
(1645) (2512) (2161) (7846) (2053) (4566) (3064)
Household business  /a 0.724 0.729 0.720 0.679 0.564 1.000 0.666
(0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.017) (0.013) (0.000) (0.011)
Community Variables
Unemployment rate (by district) 0.925 0.925 0.926 0.917 0.931 0.921 0.928
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Hired rate (by province) 0.496 0.497 0.496 0.493 0.529 0.453 0.499
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Hired rate (by district) 0.447 0.447 0.446 0.440 0.458 0.435 0.451
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Housing Infrastructure Variables
Adequate ceiling 0.538 0.540 0.537 0.636 0.522 0.493 0.559
(0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.018) (0.013) (0.016) (0.011)
Adequate floor 0.771 0.770 0.771 0.819 0.766 0.741 0.787
(0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.014) (0.011) (0.014) (0.009)
Health Price Variables
Distance time to health center /b 0.364 0.367 0.360 0.387 0.356 0.371 0.362
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004)
Waiting time to medical attention /b 1.056 1.051 1.060 1.037 1.046 1.074 1.069
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.016) (0.013) (0.014) (0.011)47
Total Population Male Population
Total Male Female Unemployed Wage Earners Self Employed Unemployed
Price Variables
Potato price  /a 0.862 0.866 0.859 0.842 0.862 0.890 0.854
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005)
Milk price  /a 1.489 1.490 1.488 1.486 1.497 1.484 1.483
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Regional and Date Variables
Costa 0.228 0.217 0.237 0.178 0.233 0.224 0.249
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.014) (0.011) (0.013) (0.010)
Other sierra 0.125 0.120 0.128 0.170 0.104 0.106 0.129
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.014) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008)
Sierra  sur 0.101 0.105 0.097 0.118 0.094 0.112 0.096
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.012) (0.008) (0.010) (0.007)
Selva alta 0.059 0.060 0.059 0.058 0.056 0.067 0.052
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005)
Selva baja 0.105 0.107 0.103 0.082 0.095 0.142 0.092
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.007)
May 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.002
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
June 0.509 0.503 0.515 0.512 0.487 0.518 0.498
(0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.019) (0.013) (0.016) (0.011)
July 0.443 0.451 0.436 0.452 0.459 0.438 0.455
(0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.019) (0.013) (0.016) (0.011)
*   The numbers indicated are the mean values of the variables
** The numbers in parentheses are the standard errors of the variables
/a  Nuevos soles of June 94
/b  In hours